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Abstract. We address the issue of the effects of considering a network of contacts on the emergence of
cooperation on social dilemmas under myopic best response dynamics. We begin by summarizing the main
features observed under less intellectually demanding dynamics, pointing out their most relevant general
characteristics. Subsequently we focus on the new framework of best response. By means of an extensive
numerical simulation program we show that, contrary to the rest of dynamics considered so far, best
response is largely unaffected by the underlying network, which implies that, in most cases, no promotion
of cooperation is found with this dynamics. We do find, however, nontrivial results differing from the well-
mixed population in the case of coordination games on lattices, which we explain in terms of the formation
of spatial clusters and the conditions for their advancement, subsequently discussing their relevance to
other networks.
PACS. 89.65.-s Social and economic systems – 87.23.Ge Dynamics of social systems – 02.50.Le Decision
theory and game theory – 89.75.Fb Structures and organization in complex systems
1 Introduction
The origin and sustainability of cooperation in animal and
human societies is a long-standing puzzle whose impor-
tance cannot be overstated [1]. Since the pioneering works
by Hamilton [2,3], and the introduction of the theoretical
setup of evolutionary game theory [4], a number of rea-
sons have been advanced as possible explanations for the
ubiquity and robustness of cooperative behavior [5] (see
also [6]). Among these proposals, network reciprocity, or
the existence of a (possibly social) network of contacts that
governs the individuals a particular one interacts with, has
received much attention in the last two decades. This spe-
cific line of research started with a seminal work by Nowak
and May [7], who studied the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
[8] game on a square lattice, finding evidence for substan-
tial amounts of cooperation in parameter regions where
defection was the only possible outcome in a well-mixed
population (i.e., when every individual interacts with ev-
ery other one). Subsequent work has explored many other
choices for the network as well as other dynamical rules
for the update of strategies in the game, giving rise to a
considerable amount of work [9] which, however, yielded
quite a few contradictory results and no global picture of
the observed phenomenology. In fact, only recently [10]
such a general conclusion was presented for homogeneous
degree networks, the case of heterogeneous ones being well
understood from other recent works [11,12].
In this paper we aim at extending our work on games
on spatial structures and homogeneous degree networks to
the case when the updating of the strategies follows the
myopic best response rule [13,14]. There are a number of
reasons that support the relevance of such a study. First,
previous works on games on networks considered in gen-
eral only imitative rules, i.e., a specific individual updates
her strategy by imitating the strategy of one of her neigh-
bors selected through different protocols (see e.g. [9] for
a review). Such updating procedure makes only modest
requirements on the cognitive capabilities and/or infor-
mation or memory of the players: in these contexts, best
response schemes are the next step of sophistication, posit-
ing that individuals revise their strategies by choosing the
best reply to the strategies used by their neighbors in the
previous time step. This choice of updating based only on
the previous action of the neighbors is the reason why this
dynamics is usually referred to as myopic [15], although
for brevity we will just use the term “best response” in
what follows. Second, best response not only endows the
individuals of the model with more complete intellectual
capabilities but also is an innovative rule, as it allows ex-
tinct strategies to be reintroduced in the system whereas
imitative dynamics cannot do that. Third, best response
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is the rule of choice in most studies from the economical
viewpoint, the reason it is not so often considered among
physicists being that it gives rise to a differential inclusion
rather than a differential equation [16] and, subsequently,
it is less amenable to analytical approaches. Finally, earlier
works on best response dynamics on lattices [14] left inter-
esting, hitherto unanswered questions such as the strong
dependence of the outcome of the evolution in coordina-
tion games on the initial conditions, a point that we will
specifically address here.
We discuss our results according to the following scheme:
In Sec. 2 we summarize what is known about evolutionary
games on networks of homogeneous degree, which includes
spatially structured populations and random networks.
We will consider in Sec. 3 the specific case of the Snowdrift
game [21] as a paradigmatic example of the difficulties
arising in these studies. We will then proceed in Sec. 4 to
present our simulation results on best response dynamics
on different types of networks and to subsequently discuss
in detail the behavior observed in lattices, providing an
explanation as to why there may be more or less coopera-
tion on lattices than on the well-mixed case, depending on
the initial conditions. Finally, Sec. 5 concludes the paper.
2 Evolutionary games on networks of
homogeneous degree
2.1 2×2 evolutionary games
The basic ingredient in the models we are going to dis-
cuss is evolutionary game theory and, in particular, 2×2
games. Let us now briefly introduce the main concepts. A
symmetric 2×2 game is a game with 2 players who choose
between 2 strategies and with no difference in role. Each
player obtains a payoff given by the following matrix
C D
C
D
(
1 S
T 0
)
.
(1)
The rows represent the strategy of the player who obtains
the payoff and the columns that of her opponent.
The strategies are labeled as C and D for cooperate and
defect, because we interpret the game as a social dilemma.
Indeed, certain values of S and T undermine a hypothet-
ical situation of mutual cooperation. If S < 0 a cooper-
ator faces the risk of losing if the other player defects,
performing worse than with mutual defection. If T > 1 a
cooperator has the temptation to defect and obtain a pay-
off larger than that of mutual cooperation. Both tensions
determine the social dilemmas represented by symmet-
ric 2 × 2 games [17]. Restricting the values of the coeffi-
cients within the intervals −1 < S < 1 and 0 < T < 2,
we have the Harmony game [18] (HG, 0 < S, T < 1)
and three classic social dilemmas: the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD, −1 < S < 0, 1 < T < 2), the Stag-Hunt game [19]
(SH, −1 < S < 0 < T < 1), and the Hawk-Dove [20] or
Snowdrift game [21] (SD, 0 < S < 1 < T < 2). Each game
corresponds, thus, to a quadrant in the ST -plane.
To study the competition between cooperation and de-
fection from an evolutionary perspective, the payoffs ob-
tained by playing the game are considered as fitness and
a darwinian dynamics is introduced to promote the fittest
strategy. The classic framework to do so is the replica-
tor dynamics [16,22], which assumes an infinite and well-
mixed population, i.e. a population with no structure,
where each individual plays with every other. Let x be
the density of cooperators, and fc and fd the fitness of
a cooperator and a defector, respectively. The replicator
dynamics states that x evolves as [16]
x˙ = x(1 − x)(fc − fd). (2)
Then, if cooperators are doing better than defectors their
density rises accordingly, and the opposite occurs if they
are doing worse. Provided that the initial density of coop-
erators x0 is different from 0 and 1, the asymptotic state
of this dynamical system is, for each game (x∗ represents
the asymptotic density of cooperators) [16]: HG, full co-
operation, x∗ = 1; PD, full defection, x∗ = 0; SH, full
cooperation if x0 > xe, or full defection if x
0 < xe; SD,
mixed population with x∗ = xe, regardless of the initial
density x0. Both in SH and SD the coexistence equilib-
rium has a cooperation density xe = S/(S + T − 1). It is
important to note that the outcome of these four games
encompasses all the possible cases for any symmetric 2×2
game [23] (see also [6]).
2.2 2×2 evolutionary games on networks
As we stated in Sec. 1, in 1992 Nowak and May [7] in-
troduced spatial structure in the context of evolutionary
games by considering the players located at the nodes of a
square lattice, playing the game only with their neighbors
(and playing the same action vs every one of them) and
not with the whole population. They introduced evolution
in this setup by using the unconditional imitation rule
(also known as “imitate-the-best” [9]), where each player
chooses the strategy of the neighbor with largest payoff,
provided this payoff is greater than the player’s. With
this rule, they found that cooperators survived by self-
organizing in clusters, where the interactions within the
clusters yielded larger payoffs to cooperators than those
obtained by defectors at the boundaries of cooperators’
clusters.
Nowak and May’s pioneering work opened the way to a
large number of studies focused on different games, differ-
ent evolutionary rules, and different lattices or networks.
As a loose conclusion of those works, it was generally be-
lieved that the existence of structure in the population,
whether spatial or of another kind, enhanced the emer-
gence of cooperation in games where defection was the
norm. However, such conclusion did not agree with all the
available research, contradictions arose at several points
(an example of which will be discussed in Sec. 3 below)
and there were no studies that identified parameter re-
gions where one could firmly establish it. Therefore, in
[10] we carried out a very ambitious simulation program,
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Fig. 1. Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in homogeneous random networks (upper row, A to D) compared to regular
lattices (lower row, E to H), with degree k = 4 (first and third columns, A, E, C, G) and k = 8 (second and forth columns,
B, F, D, H). Left plots (A, B, E, F) correspond to the replicator update rule, where right ones (C, D, G, H) use unconditional
imitation as update rule(see text). The initial density of cooperators is x0 = 0.5 in all cases. The graphs display the key role of
both the clustering of the network and the update rule (see main text). The promotion of cooperation is, in general, restricted
to SH. The influence on PD is only significant when the update rule is unconditional imitation.
as a result of which we were able to reach some unam-
biguous conclusions. While a full report of our results is
available in [10], we find it convenient to briefly recall here
a few of the ideas presented there, both as background in-
formation for the reader as well as to introduce the way
we will present our new results.
One of the most relevant findings reported in [10] was
that the spatial structure of a population, when modeled
by a regular lattice, only has a significant effect on co-
operation when the clustering coefficient is high, as seen
by comparing results with those of homogeneous random
networks of the same degree. This is illustrated by Fig. 1,
where results for random homogeneous networks (upper
row) are compared to results on regular lattices (lower
row). Only when there is high transitivity or clustering in
the network [24], as occurs for regular lattices of degree
k = 8, significant differences appear.
Fig. 1 also highlights the crucial influence of the update
rule. Right columns show the results with unconditional
imitation (introduced above), while the left ones present
those obtained with the so-called replicator rule [16,22].
This rule is defined as follows: Let i = 1 . . .N label the
individuals in the population. Let si be the strategy of
player i, pii her payoff and Ni her neighborhood. With the
replicator update rule one neighbor j of player i is chosen
at random, j ∈ Ni. The probability of player i adopting
the strategy of player j is given by
ptij ≡ P{s
t
j → s
t+1
i } =
{
(pitj − pi
t
i)/Φ : pi
t
j > pi
t
i
0 : pitj ≤ pi
t
i
, (3)
with Φ = k(max(1, T )−min(0, S)) to ensure P(·) ∈ [0, 1].
Fig. 1 presents the results for the space of 2× 2 games
as a whole, using a color code which will be the same
hereafter. Furthermore, we have introduced a quantita-
tive measure CG for the overall asymptotic cooperation in
game G (= HG, PD, SH, SD), given by the mean value
of x∗ over the corresponding region in the ST -plane. This
global index of cooperation has a range CG ∈ [0, 1] and
appears on the graphs by the quadrant of each game.
Both the qualitative assessment of the plots and the com-
parison of the values of this quantitative index yield an
important regularity in the effect of the social structure
modeled by this kind of networks: cooperation is generally
enforced in coordination games (SH), specially when the
clustering coefficient is high, whereas it is inhibited in anti-
coordination games (SD). Remarkably, the positive effect
on PD requires a particular update rule, namely uncondi-
tional imitation. We refer the interested reader to [10] for
a complete discussion on these and related issues.
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Fig. 2. Simulations of the models discussed in [25] (A) and
[26] (B). The lines mark the range of parameters studied in
both works. See text for a discussion.
3 The case of SD
Previous section introduced an important property of these
evolutionary models, the crucial dependence that the re-
sult has on the update rule. We will now discuss a specific
example which, on the one hand, allows us to make this
point and, on the other hand, will introduce us to our main
subject, namely the effects of best response dynamics.
In 2004, Hauert and Doebeli [25] presented a study of
the Snowdrift game in which they concluded that, con-
trary to the general belief, the existence of a spatial struc-
ture may inhibit cooperation. To that end, they studied
the dependence of the level of cooperation on the param-
eter r, the cost-benefit ratio (understood as cost of coop-
erating and corresponding benefit accrued), which in our
parameterization is r = (T − S)/2. They did not consider
the whole ST -plane but only the line given by T = 1+ r,
S = 1 − r (see Fig. 2) and obtained asymptotic levels of
cooperation below those found in well mixed populations.
One year later, Sysi-Aho and coworkers [26] repeated
the same study changing only the dynamical rule: Where
Hauert and Doebeli had used the replicator rule men-
tioned above, Sysi-Aho and coworkers used the best re-
sponse rule, introducing a probability p < 1 to update
strategy, i.e., at every time step every player chose her
strategy as a best response to their neighbors with prob-
ability p or left it unchanged with probability 1 − p. The
reason to do that is to prevent the systems from falling
onto a sequence of alternate states of full defection and full
cooperation, which is an artifact of the rule (and which are
never reached as soon as p < 1, see [26]). They studied the
same range of parameters, finding that cooperation sub-
sisted even for r close to 1, being larger (resp. smaller)
than in a well mixed population for large (resp. small) r.
In order to understand better this issue, we have re-
produced the simulations in [25,26], using the same square
lattices, neighborhoods (k = 8) and initial conditions (co-
operation and defection equally likely) they used, obtain-
ing the results we summarize in Fig. 2. As we may see,
the two different dynamics lead to rather different results
when looked at in the framework of the whole ST -plane.
We stress that, along the line indicated in the plots, we
exactly reproduce the results reported in those previous
studies. There is indeed a decrease of cooperation when
using the replicator dynamics as in [25], along the line of
interest but also in the SD quadrant as a whole. How-
ever, when the dynamics is best response we do observe a
stepped profile in the SD quadrant as Sysi-Aho et al. did,
while the mean value of the cooperation over the quadrant
is the same as in a well mixed population. The reader is
referred to the middle panel of Fig. 3, where the results
on a well mixed population with the same initial condition
are depicted.
These results open up a series of questions, beginning
with the following: What is the effect of best response dy-
namics on other networks, given that on a square lattice
its effect is not very noticeable? Let us recall that best
response is a step further towards “intelligence” of the
agents as compared to the replicator rule, an imitative,
non-innovative dynamics, and therefore we might expect
that players could exploit better the existence of a net-
work. This issue is what we discuss in detail in what fol-
lows. However, there is a more general problem, namely
what does it mean “promotion of cooperation by the struc-
ture of a population”? Do we refer to a specific set of pa-
rameters, such as the line studied in [25,26]? Do we refer
to a global measure of the cooperation level in a region,
such as the values we compute for each quadrant? Or do
we refer to the ST -plane as a whole? Note that in this
last case the replicator rule of Hauert and Doebeli, while
indeed leading to less cooperation in the SD game, yields
a very large increase of the cooperative region in the SH
quadrant, favoring players to coordinate in the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium [22]. Had we been looking at that
quadrant only, we would have certainly concluded that co-
operation is promoted by the square lattice. Or, looking at
the SD game, had we considered unconditional imitation
as the update rule, we would have found evidence of spa-
tial structure fostering cooperation in SD. While we will
not dwell any further in this issue here (but see [10,27] for
a discussion in depth of these problems) we want to stress
that statements about promotion of cooperation should
be made in a much more specific manner without trying
to attach to them unchecked general implications beyond
the scope of the case under study.
4 Best response dynamics
4.1 Different types of networks
Motivated by the reasons discussed in the introduction
and by the issues raised by our study in Sec. 3, we un-
dertook the study of the effects of the best response dy-
namics on a large family of networks. We considered lat-
tices, which may represent spatial structure, homogeneous
random networks (random networks where all nodes have
exactly the same degree), Erdo¨s-Renyi random networks
[28], small-world networks, Baraba´si-Albert [29] scale free
networks and Klemm-Egu´ıluz [30] scale free networks with
different mean degrees, thus exploring all possible combi-
nations of small-world phenomena, scale free behavior and
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Fig. 3. Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in well mixed populations under best response dynamics, with p = 0.1 (see main
text), when the initial density of cooperators is x0 = 1/3 (left, A), x0 = 1/2 (middle, B) and x0 = 2/3 (right, C).
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Fig. 4. Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in random (left, A and D), regular (middle, B and E), and scale-free networks
(right, C and F) with degrees k = 4 (upper row, A to C) and 8 (lower row, D to F). The update rule is best response with
p = 0.1 and the initial density of cooperators is x0 = 0.5. Differences are negligible in all cases; note, however, that the steps
appearing in the SD quadrant are slightly different.
large or small clustering. We have also considered the com-
plete graph as the reference for a well mixed population,
results for which are presented in Fig. 3.
We will begin by focusing on the case in which the ini-
tial conditions are a 50% of cooperators and a 50% of de-
fectors. Our reference for comparison will then be Fig. 3 B,
corresponding to a well-mixed (complete network) popu-
lation with that initial condition. A small subset of our
results for the other networks is presented in Fig. 4, show-
ing that the asymptotic behavior does not depend at all on
the type of network considered, with the only and unim-
portant exception of slight differences in the stepping in
SD. We want to stress that we have tested many other
networks aside from those presented here with exactly the
same results. Not only the mean cooperation levels per
quadrant are practically the same, but also the depen-
dence on S and T for each quadrant. We note that this
is a very remarkable result, in so far as for most other
(imitative) dynamics studied there is always a largely no-
ticeable effect of the type of network on which the games
are played, as we have seen above (cf. Figs. 1 and 2; see
also [10,11] for more details on homogeneous and scale
free networks, respectively). We have made every effort to
ensure that our results are robust and independent of the
technicalities of the simulations. To begin with, we have
checked a correct convergence, verifying that simulation
times larger up to a factor of 10 lead to the same results.
On the other hand, the probability parameter p, which
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Fig. 5. Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in regular lat-
tices with degree k = 8. The update rule is best response and
the initial density of cooperators is x0 = 0.5. Left (A): asyn-
chronous updating with p = 0.1; right (B): synchronous updat-
ing with p = 0.01. Both results are virtually identical to that of
Fig. 4 E, which was obtained with synchronous updating and
p = 0.1.
governs how often agents update their strategy, is not rel-
evant, and neither it is the use of asynchronous updating
(see Fig 5), in which an agent is chosen at random to up-
date its strategy after a round of the game has been played
by her and her neighbors (we note that asynchronicity was
reported to have a small but noticeable effect with imita-
tive update rules in [10]). With all these checks, we can fi-
nally state our first conclusion, namely that best response
dynamics is insensitive to the type of network on which
the game is played, meaning that when the networks are
initiated from the same proportion of cooperators and de-
fectors the asymptotic results are the same as well. This
unexpected result may have interesting implications in ap-
plied contexts, implications which we will discuss in the
concluding Section.
4.2 The effect of initial conditions
Having found that best response is largely unaffected by
playing the different 2×2 games on a network, we extended
our analysis of the problem to consider different initial
conditions. We initiated our simulations with an initial
density of cooperators x0 = 1/3 or x0 = 2/3 and repeated
our simulation program for our family of networks. In or-
der to understand the observed phenomenology, we find
it convenient to begin the discussion by the case of lat-
tices. Figure 6 shows the results for lattices with different
number of neighbors and x0 = 1/3 (the outcome of the
simulations for x0 = 2/3 is similar, with the green region
in the SH quadrant of Fig. 5 being symmetrically located
below the S = T − 1 line). As can be seen from Fig. 6,
for 4 and 6 neighbors the results for x0 = 1/3 are indis-
tinguishable from the results for x0 = 1/2. This must be
compared with Fig. 3 A, which shows for a well-mixed
population a cooperative region in the SH quadrant that
is roughly a 50% of the one we have obtained on lattices.
As the asymptotics is the same for lattices with 4 and
6 neighbors, we also conclude that the clustering of the
network does not play any role. On the other hand, the
lattice with 8 neighbors shows a striking result, namely
the appearance on the SH quadrant of a region with in-
termediate values of cooperation. Let us recall that, as a
stand-alone game, SH has two equilibria, full cooperation
or full defection, and that depending on the initial condi-
tion the system ends up in one or the other. This is the
behavior observed in all the lattices and networks studied
so far with imitative rules and also was what we observed
for best response with x0 = 0.5.
In order to understand this surprising feature, the ap-
pearance of regions with seemingly mixed behavior in SH
and its dependence on the number of neighbors, appear-
ing for 8 neighbors but not for smaller numbers, we have
looked in detail at the time evolution of specific realiza-
tions. Fig. 7 presents a representative example of this dy-
namics with 8 neighbors and for values of S and T in
the intermediate region we are interested in. We clearly
observe that there is an initial stage in which isolated co-
operators (in red) die out and only clusters with a sig-
nificantly larger presence of cooperators avoid extinction
and eventually begin to grow. A careful look at the pic-
tures and at the whole time evolution allows one to notice
that clusters grow due to the advancement of some of its
sides, in particular those which are basically flat but have
just one kink, whereas some others are stopped unless hit
by some other advancing front. Very clearly observable
among the latter are diagonal fronts (see, in particular,
the last three frames in the sequence). This can be easily
understood analytically by just considering the different
possible types of front and the conditions for their ad-
vancement in terms of best response dynamics. Thus, for
a planar front such as
C C C D D D
C C C D D D
C C C D D D
C C C D D D
C C C D D D
C C C D D D
the borderline defectors will become cooperators if S >
3(T − 1)/5, whereas cooperators are transformed into de-
fectors if S < 5(T − 1)/3. Therefore, in the intermediate
region 5(T − 1)/3 < S < 3(T − 1)/5 planar fronts are
stable in the lattice with 8 neighbors. It is easy to check
that diagonal fronts are stable in this region as well. This
must be compared with the situation when there is a kink
in the front, as in
C C C D D D
C C C D D D
C C C D D D
C C C C D D
C C C C D D
C C C C D D
In this case the defector at the kink becomes a coopera-
tor if S > T − 1, and the cooperator at the kink becomes
a defector in the opposite case, S < T − 1. Therefore,
for this type of front there is no stability region and it
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Fig. 6. Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in regular lattices with initial density of cooperators x0 = 1/3. The degrees are
k = 4 (left, A), k = 6 (middle, B) and k = 8 (right, C). The update rule is best response with p = 0.1. Equivalent (symmetrical)
results are obtained for x0 = 2/3 (see main text).
Fig. 7. Snapshots of the evolution on a regular lattice of degree k = 8, under best response dynamics with p = 0.1. Sites
depicted in red are cooperators, blue ones are defectors. The initial density of cooperators is x0 = 1/3. The game parameters
are S = −0.6, T = 0.2, in the SH quadrant. Times are as indicated in the snapshots. System size is 100×100 with periodic
boundary conditions. In this particular realization, cooperation eventually dominates entirely the lattice.
always advances in one direction or the other. This anal-
ysis shows that the fate of a specific realization depends
on the geometry of the clusters arising at its first stage.
What we see in the special region in Fig. 6 C is the re-
sult of some simulations that cannot reach full cooperation
because the growing clusters arrest at some point in the
simulations, whereas in other cases their geometry is such
(as in Fig. 7) that the system ends up dominated entirely
by cooperators. We note that the discussion is symmet-
rical with respect to the initial condition and it can be
applied to explain the results for x0 = 2/3 (not shown).
It remains to be explained why the other lattices do
not show this region of intermediate behavior. The reason
can again be traced back to the geometry of the clusters:
Consider, for instance, the case with 4 neighbors. One can
then show that diagonal fronts are never stable and, in
fact, are subject to the same conditions as planar fronts
with a kink, making it much more difficult for a particular
realization to have all its clusters arrested. Hence, in the
simulations on the lattice with 4 neighbors situations with
a mixed population of cooperators and defectors are never
found. A similar reasoning explains the results for the 6
neighbor lattice.
The mechanism behind the appearance of the mixed
populations suggests that the coexistence of cooperators
and defectors in the SH may be due to finite size effects. To
check this possibility, we have simulated the lattice with 8
neighbors on a large variety of sizes, plotting a histogram
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Fig. 8. Normalized histogram of the asymptotic densities of
cooperators x∗ reached in the simulations on regular lattices
of degree k = 8 with initial density of cooperators x0 = 1/3.
The update rule is best response with p = 0.1. Sizes are as
indicated in the plot. Note that the value at x∗ = 1 goes out
of range for the two largest sizes. S and T are as in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 9. Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in homogeneous
random (left, A) and scale free (right, B) networks with ini-
tial density of cooperators x0 = 1/3. The update rule is best
response with p = 0.1. Equivalent (symmetrical) results are
obtained for x0 = 2/3.
of the number of realizations that stop on a mixed popula-
tion. The result is depicted in Fig. 8, showing clearly that
as the system size grows the number of asymptotically
mixed realizations becomes negligible. This is a strong in-
dication that in the infinite size limit the 8 neighbor lattice
will behave as those with less neighbors, arriving always
at the same asymptotics as for the x0 = 0.5 initial con-
dition, at least for initial data not too close to x0 = 0 or
x0 = 1. We note, however, that for applications of these
ideas to real life problems, where populations (e.g., in a
social context) are finite, it may be possible to observe
mixed populations in SH dilemmas under best response
dynamics.
Finally, with the understanding of the observations on
lattices at hand, we have also looked at the effect of initial
conditions on other networks. Two examples of our sim-
ulations are presented in Fig. 9. By comparing with the
well mixed result in Fig. 3 A, we see that initial conditions
different from x0 = 0.5 also give rise to non trivial effects
on random and scale free lattices. No regions of mixed
populations are observed, and the mean cooperation level
increases slightly when going from well mixed to homo-
geneous random and from there to scale free networks,
but always to a lesser extent than on lattices. Unfortu-
nately. the topology of these networks renders the analysis
in terms of clusters unapplicable. We do not have a clear
understanding of this small promotion of cooperation (in-
hibition in the case x0 = 2/3) on these networks, but we
can tentatively hypothesize the development of weak, long
range correlations, which would be responsible for such a
weaker effect, in contrast to those of lattices, of a short
and stronger nature.
5 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have presented a thorough analysis of
myopic best response dynamics on 2 × 2 social dilemmas
with different types of networks. The original motivation
of our results was the clarification of the discrepancies
among the work of Hauert and Doebeli [25] and Sysi-Aho
et al. [26], who reported an inhibition (resp. promotion) of
cooperation in the SD game on square lattices. We have
shown that the problem is that the comparison is basi-
cally meaningless in so far as they use different update
rules (proportional update or replicator dynamics vs best
response) and also because restricting the comparison to
SD games leads to missing the larger picture of the set
of possible dilemmas. Indeed, in the proportional update
dynamics there is a large increase of cooperation in the
SH quadrant, which contrasts with the phenomenology of
the SD dilemma (as is generically the case, see [10]).
Our analysis of myopic best response dynamics has
yielded two main results: First, there is practically no
effect of the type of network considered on the asymp-
totic behavior for any value of the game parameters; and,
second, there is a noticeable effect of the initial condi-
tions with particular importance in the case of lattices.
The first result is most interesting, more so if viewed in
the context of previous work on imitative rules [10,11]. In
principle, given the definition of best response dynamics,
one would not expect important effects on the Harmony
and PD quadrants, where there is only one global best
response and therefore the network can not introduce any
novel feature. However, the fact that SD has only one sta-
ble equilibrium of a mixed character, that may be difficult
to fulfill in the presence of a network, or the bistable na-
ture of SH allow to expect some influence from the inter-
action networks. The fact that there is none (at least at a
global level, for the whole network; local peculiarities are
not being considered here) is therefore quite remarkable
and casts a shadow of doubt on the applicability of the
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studies of imitative rules to specific socio-economic con-
texts. Indeed, if using a rule with a higher degree of intel-
ligence renders the network effect unnoticeable, whereas
it is crucial for simple (non-innovative) dynamics, one can
presume that the behavior of actual economic agents will
be closer to best response and hence network-independent
to some extent. Interestingly, this idea may be related to
the fact that models of network formation in economics
often lead to very simple networks (see, e.g., [31,32], and
references in the latter), which might be another hint of
the secondary role played by the network structure in eco-
nomical applications.
On the other hand, we have also seen that there are
network effects even under best response dynamics, that
arise in the dependence of the asymptotic behavior on
the initial conditions. Lattices are prominent examples of
these phenomena and, using the regularity of their struc-
ture, we have been able to trace the differences with well-
mixed populations to the formation of clusters, whose sta-
bility depends on the degree of the lattice (at least for
finite size lattices). We have thus seen that cooperation
may be promoted (resp. inhibited) in the SH quadrant in
situations when the initial amount of cooperators would
be insufficient (resp. sufficient) to take the system to full
cooperation. The effect is also observed on other networks,
always with the same symmetrical character, but the rea-
son for this behavior remains still an open issue. Again, in
a economical context this result is interesting because it is
generally believed that best response does not exhibit any
new feature when used on a network, whereas here we see
that the dependence on the initial conditions is not the
same as in the complete network.
Finally, from a more general viewpoint, we have pre-
sented yet another example that the phenomenology of so-
cial dilemmas on networks is largely non universal. While
best response turns out to be peculiar in the sense that it
gives rise to network-independent behavior, it is important
to realize that once again changing the dynamics of the
strategy update leads to large, non-trivial changes in the
results of evolution as compared to other rules. Further-
more, as we have already mentioned, only a full study of
the whole space of dilemmas under consideration (in our
case, 2× 2 games) can shed some light on the mechanism
governing the evolution on different networks and under
different rules. In this sense, we have presented here a de-
tailed analysis of best response games which highlights the
fact that, as compared to what is observed on well-mixed
populations, the dilemma that is most affected is SH, i.e.,
risky situations, rather than contexts in which the impor-
tant tension is the temptation to defect. This is clearly
related to the bistable character of SH, in which the best
response tends to be equal to the opponent’s actions, and
suggests that similar mechanisms may be at work in games
and dilemmas with more players and/or strategies. Fur-
ther research along these lines is needed to confirm these
intuitions.
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